tv Today in Washington CSPAN November 27, 2012 6:00am-9:00am EST
almost four times what the rest of public education costs. and the vast majority of our basis we just public schools. we could take the money we're spending today, pay every public school system 14,000 a child, and save billions of dollars per year. and with the same or better outcomes. >> this weekend you can talk with oklahoma senator tom coburn about the fiscal cliff, affordable care act and the future of the republican party on booktv's "in depth." he has written several books and reports including his latest, the debt mama. join our conversation, your calls, e-mails and tweets and facebook comments for medical doctor, author and senator coburn on c-span2.
>> [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. if i could ask are going to take their seats. welcome to the arms control association the national american council titled iran 2013, making diplomacy work. i'm the president of the national american council and welcome to all our viewers on c-span as well. it's been almost exactly four years since president obama's a famously extended his hand of friendship and hope the iranians would unclench their fists. yet today after a few rounds of diplomacy, plenty more sanctions and centrifuge, there are plenty of clinched this on both sides
and very little talk about friendship. there's been an attempt at diplomacy but political constraints on both sides have been difficult to advance an old habits are difficult to break. obama's one of the lowest in 2009 was quickly closed by the human rights abuses in the iran following the fraudulent elections. as well as a growing pressure from congress as will some u.s. allies in the region against diplomacy. focus shifted to sanctions and tehran responded by further expanding its nuclear program leaving both sides worse off today than they were a few years ago. in the meantime, sanctions have held iranian middle class for the impoverished population while the regime's repression and human rights abuses have continued to intensify and its nuclear program has continued to expand. but a new window for opportunity for diplomacy has opened through obama's convincing real election, and in the next few
months, up until the iranian new year, both sides enjoy maximum political space and maneuverability to negotiate effectively. the logic of diplomacy is obvious. it's the only option that can truly resolve the issue. sanctions can cripple iran's economy at the expense of destiny that pro-democracy movement there, but sanctions alone cannot resolve this issue. the military option can set back the program for a year or two but only at the expense of ensuring that eventually iran eventually gets the nuclear weapon. only diplomacy can provide a real and sustainable solution. this is no mystery to president obama, who at his november 14 press conference, declared his dedication to diplomatic solution. i quote him. there should be a way in which they, the iranians, can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting their international obligation.
and providing clear issuances to the international community that they're not pursuing a nuclear weapon. and so yet i will try to make bush in the coming months to see we can open a dialogue with between iran and not just the united states, but the international community, to see if we can get this thing resolved, end quote. diplomacy is the obvious option but is not obvious how diplomacy can succeed. today with some of the foremost experts on this issue with us, to help find a way to make diplomacy succeed in 2013. and later after the panel discussion we'll hear from former national security advisor zbigniew brzezinski whose lucid analysis never fails to impress or enlighten us. before handed over to digital camera, executive director of the arms control association, let me also thank our sponsors foods generous support for our work has made this conference possible. the rockefeller brothers fund. daryl, the floor is yours. >> thank you very much in bank
fee council for working with the arms control association on this event. i'm daryl kimball, executive director of aca. it's a pleasure to be here. and as trita said, this issue has been lingering with us for some time, even before president obama came into office. the united states, china, france, germany, russia, known as the p5+1, and the united kingdom have tried to negotiate with iran over its nuclear program. of sides have fumbled the opportunities to reduce the risks of nuclear-armed iran, and to prevent the risk of war, to reduce the risk of war over that nuclear program. since 2007, the u.s. and western intelligence agencies have assessed that iran is nuclear capable, meaning that iran has a scientific, technical and industrial capacity to
eventually produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so. and those intelligence agencies continue to this day to assess that iran has not yet made a decision to do so. intelligence agencies and independent experts also believe that starting from today iran will require several months to acquire enough this'll material for just one bomb and still more time to build a deliverable nuclear weapon. secretary of defense and a estimate it would take two to three years to do so. in the latest international atomic energy agency report, based on its ongoing inspections iran's nuclear facility, particularly the fordo enrichment facility find that iran continues to expand enrichment pass the iranian patrician capacity. 20% levels which is closer to the 90% for weapons grades and iran continues to refuse to
address the iaea's questions about the potential military dimensions of its nuclear program. and it continues to resist tougher international inspections known as the iaea additional protocol. so we believe that there is time and clearly there's an interest from all parties to reach a diplomatic solution. and after several rounds of negotiations between the p5+1, and iran, it looks as though there will be a new round of talks in the next month, but perhaps early in 2011. it's also clear that the two sides have put forward specific concrete proposal, but those proposals have some different ideas come particularly about the sequencing of the steps necessary to assure the international community that iran's program is peaceful and from every perspective start to
roll back the very tough national and international sanctions are in place. we have organized today's session just about a month after the u.s. residential election to have a focused discussion on the options now for the p5+1 group, and iran come in this next round of talks which could provide the best opportunity in a long time to resolve this long running impasse him to guard against a nuclear-armed iran, a potential military strike on iran's nuclear facilities over its program. so we are very honored today to three of the world's top experts on these issues, on nuclear nonproliferation and the middle east region. we have with us tonight immediate left the former head of united nations special commission on iraq, ambassador rolf ekeus is here with us from sweden. we have dr. ahmad sadri,
professor of sociology and anthropology and the james p. gorter chair of islamic world studies at lake forest college, and when dr. jim walsh, research associate at the massachusetts institute of technology's security studies program. and with that come with asked each of them to take about five to seven minutes to provide their perspectives on three basic questions. with the new window of opportunity open for diplomacy, what are the next steps that each side can and should take to resolve proliferation concerns and reduce the risk of war, how might each side a just a respective proposals to get to a win-win situation for both sides, and what are the best, what's the best pass -- path for both parties to take to get there. could for instance, additional direct u.s.-iran talks help advance progress? and so we're going to hear from each of them for about five or seven and spirit afterwards will
take questions from reporters first and then from our audience, three by five cards in your folder so as questions occur to you, you might jot those down and someone will take the card and pass them forward in just a few minutes. so with that introduction, well, everyone, and ambassador ekeus, if you could start us off, give us your perspective on those key questions, the next phase. >> thank you. i must say that if you don't do much, if you continue, there is a high risk it will look the same. iran will continue, of course it's enrichment, it may improve capabilities, ability to go out to 20%. israel and u.s. will feel that the case for military action,
low-level violence will continue against, you know, against iran. and israel will prepare, considering, no, potentially success of the operation against the facility in syria. and that this may hold iran's restraints to acquire nuclear weapons. so we are in really concerned with situation, and let me add that people of iran will continue to suffer under very tough sanctions. so, there are two things which must change, diplomacy and inspections. first diplomacy. p5+1 has served as united front. five plus one means to me united
nations, security council related, global responsibility to europeans like to prefer 3+3, which means the european union is the main player. i'm a little nervous about if you're in europe you had better say three plus the otherwise you will not be served dinner. [laughter] but i think it is, five plus one of course is important to keep on. but i think u.s. should not do, u.s. does not hide inside this group. u.s. has now time to take responsibility. and to change, to start with its relations with iran. isn't it time now, they give up on the occupation of the u.s. embassy in connection with islamic revolution of 1979.
should also the iranians try to forget the shooting down in the gulf of iranian airliner. and we have i think americans in iran who was not part of 9/11. it is very difficult to me what the problem with diplomatic relations with iran but there was no problem for the u.s. to ever i think -- [inaudible] truman and eisenhower had relations with stalin. my god, stalin was something much worse. but these leaders, there is sort of nervousness to be in touch with something which is not totally wonderful. and what i think is interesting now that the u.s. and iran must recognize that the serious common interests in the region, it is first of all afghanistan.
2014, the nato military presence will be terminated. and something must replace that. if there is a special situation, i must say we u.s. and iran, common interests, that the talibans, al qaeda will take over that country. and i think there is very, very important possibility. iraq, same thing. where is iraq going? i think it is high time that u.s. and iran start dialogue on these two strategically important issues. totally neglected and i'm a little upset about that. because what u.s. must swallow is it has to eliminate all talking about regime change in iran. it is up to the iranian people, reform is, the people who like to change the society.
it's not united states which should make a regime change. and, of course, therefore, i think establish thematic relations. [inaudible] with switzerland or, wonderful diplomatic, wonderful people, but still, you have to have, take a have the courage to talk to the other guy and try to establish relations. and not send information through newspapers or brussels or other places. it is the u.s. should establish its own direct dialogue. so that's one thing. and the other, the inspections, and i think there is almost too simple to be true. i mean, one should recognize iran's right to enrich, enrichment technology.
but one should also start a gradual process of lifting the sanctions, economic and other. of course, this shouldn't be for free. it must be an intrusive, permanent monitoring system including an early warning system inside iran's nuclear establishment. i will talk later about shut down because we have circumstance. but it would also prevent breakout program, or as evidence would immediately give sequence to international community. of course, breakout program should be met with tough sanctions. into very much. -- thank you very much. professor sadri. spent i accept the promotion. >> your perspectives on the next
steps in the next round. >> what a wonderful basis to start with. indeed, 34 years hiatus in iran, u.s. relations, assuming the last 10 years of nuclear negotiations, provides a ground for pessimism, so people will say well, no time is a good time to start negotiating with iran. perfect time will never come, and i think right now is the right time right after the american elections. and right before the iranian elections started. remember back in 2008 when we were in the same point in the cycle, except right now on the ground the situation is much worse. there's more fissile material. there's more ill will, and there is less of an optimism. so i would say this is the perfect time to start the
negotiations. in 2008, the obama administration didn't go for it, calculating rationally that probably a settlement of the issue at the time would benefit president ahmadinejad and help him in his bid for a second round. well, we all know what happened. that election didn't work. there was unrest in the streets and the turmoil completely consumed the rest of that year. and so, basically i think this is as good as any time to start negotiations. so what is stopping us from doing this? of course there's a synergy of inaction on both sides and invested political interest to generate a kind of in group solidarity from the image of a demonized other, on the other side. but there is only one way to break this logjam, and that is,
i think the two sides should, this block of marble and see the statue inside the block, apply to think to apply pressure, force, but also perspective to breakout a new compromise out of this situation. and there are risks and there are rewards to this. any politician who openly says i'm going to make peace with the other side and resolve this issue would be -- out of hand if they don't succeed. but there are also great rewards because we also know the politician, to cut his 10 year old, will have a place in history. so what is keeping the supreme leader of iran, khamenei, from coming forward? i had an occasion years ago, maybe i will talk about later in question and answer, that
persuaded me that khamenei has a paranoid mind about americans, to say that he is really of american lives and negotiators is really to understate the problem. but, of course, we all know that just because you're paranoid, but the cocteau might be hiding under your bed doesn't mean that there is no crocodile under your bed. in order to get an inside of the iranians are looking at this, there's a new book by the iranian chief negotiator that is on amazon. it's called the iranian nuclear crisis, mmr -- a memoir. take issue a very good insight of how iranians are looking at this. there was a scene in this book where he walks in and there's a new delegation and they are saying, well, let's start negotiations about proposal. one of the items is why negotiation going on please don't enriched uranium.
so he asked well, how about you think it's going to go but they say about 10 years. so i mean, americans suspect iran is of running the clock. that is running the clock. and when he goes to khamenei insist this is what they say, khamenei as i told you so. and i'm actually sure he has. so this is like there is this paranoia and distrust on the side that is kind of if there is no relationship, of course these kind of negative feelings are reinforced. now, how do we break out of this? well, ambassador has always said it is very easy to imagine this kind of unbelievable that people have not resulted. what course iran's international -- [inaudible] under the articles of nbc, and also very good warning system and
inspections should be established to prevent iran from weaponizing. no-brainer. why isn't working? is because of the mistrust on both sides. and so it has been this confidence building measures, people have to come up with confidence building measures. iran, if you can imagine what that would be. in reaching 3.5 or 5%, and put all the 20% in which material under iaea very direct and very good monitoring systems. what can americans do to build confidence? i think that's a good question to ask as well. what can americans do? the beauty as americans don't need to do anything. within these negotiations. in my view, the thing to do for the president of the united states is to revive the
discourse of nuclear disarmament. the call from prague, he started his presidency with, bold, universal, very attractive and i believe he got the nobel peace prize from broaching that issue. he may not have earned it yet. this is a perfect opportunity for president obama to revive the discourse but and if he does, of course i would venture to guess that the global would be a better place to live, and i think everybody would be safer if they are less nuclear weapons in the world. but this also curiously would act as a catalyst in this particular iran united states relationship. because if the nuclear powers in the world are not coming to nonnuclear powers, as they do, as was a and not that we did and continue to do, if the nuclear
powers say we're going to take a step back and you don't develop, this puts us behind in the nonproliferation discourse, and it will put logical legs on it. and it will be much more effective, and i would venture to say that's what good confidence building measure that will not be actually even confidence building within this particular framework. it would operate on a much larger level. and would be the catalyst to bring iranians and americans may be in a one plus one setting. i hope it happens. and hopefully, help resolve this issue. >> thank you. jim walsh, your perspectives on what the two sides can do in this next phase. >> first, i want to thank niac and arms control association for put together this terrific event. for allowing me to be on this panel with my distinguished colleagues.
i don't know that i'm going to say something entirely different than what's been said so far. i will try to make it spicy. let's begin with context. it is déjà vu all over again. we've been here before where we thought it would be opportunities to advance a resolution of this problem, and then one side or another, and believe me, it's been both sides off and on overtime, have failed to follow through. most recently was in the fall of 2009 when there looked like there might be a small deal around the 20%, and iran just never came back to the table. they have their own internal political problems, and so you can only have a negotiation if there are two sides to negotiate with, and they went away. similarly, the u.s. some years ago and for sometime missed several opportunities. so here we are and we have to ask yourself the question, we've got a good opportunity now, but what do we have to do that is
different? since we tried before and failed, what are we going to do that is different than last time? let me remind you we have had success in 2003, there was an agreement to suspend iran's enrichment program for two years. people forget that. so success is possible. you will not have success if you continue to simply repeat the things you did before that didn't work. i think what you think about this differently. my since, i've read both and a running proposal that was circulated in september around the time of president ahmadinejad's visit. i've spoken to as policymakers about this. you know, to act with the comments of my colleagues, there's a real lack of trust on both sides. there are those in the iranian government to think the u.s. is simply about regime change. and evidence-based he is they see scientists being assassinated. assassinated. daisy sabotage against the nuclear plants. they see covert operations of one kind or another, and when you're sitting in tehran that looks a lot like pressure towards regime change, if you're inclined to think it. in the u.s. the people in the u.s. who think despite iran
having stopped its program in 2003, iran is determined to get the bomb, no matter what. they believe in the heart to be true. so these talks are simply again, a smokescreen. and so it's hard to have a real negotiation when one side thinks the other side is determined to cheat, and the other side thinks they're trying to knock them out of office and deposed him. so i think we have to grapple with this issue of is the other side serious or not. had we demonstrate to the other side? and i need is for both sides, that they are serious. at scientists and the current set of proposals from both sides, both want to get a deal around age of 20% enrichment. i won't go into a lot of details about that, but they want to play small ball. it's something come and then push the can down the road. i think that's a mistake but i think that is a mistake. first of all, you are shrinking a negotiation space. if all you're going to talk about his 20%, then you can't
talk about, iranian disagreements, there's no other sort of topics you can begin to trade against to expand and sort of get an agreement. >> jim, can you elaborate by the 20% is of interest? >> so, let me say, you know, four years ago there was a 20% issue. there was no 20%. what is now risen to the top of the agenda, ironically, is something that was originally started out as a confidence building measure. you enrich uranium three to 5%. you can't make a nuclear weapon with three to 5% enriched uranium. three to 5% is what is used for power reactors. there are some reactors, research reactors that produce medical isotopes and other things, and then require 20%. when you enrich to 20%, yes, you're going towards 90 but you're not part of the way. way. you can't substantially far down the path towards 90% because the hard part is when you first
start enriching. the more you enrich the easier it becomes to get to higher and higher levels. so 20% is what has the nonproliferation community freaked out. you don't like the fact iran is enriching to 20% and they don't like the fact that iran is accumulating quantities of 20% that might be quickly enriched to 90%. interestingly if you look at the last several iaea reports, let's say the last three, they are issued every three months, iran had started enrichment to 20% but has imposed self-restraint on it. they know that the west and others are freaked out about the 20%. and so they have produced some of the more they produce, they found other ways to deal with it. so the total level has not increased in a way that would've on the other side. iranians are aware of this as well. went ahmadinejad, and, of course, he's not a person who calls the shots. is on the outside to get anything right now, at a minimum he's a lame duck it is all about the supreme leader. but he is still part of the
government. when he was in new york in september, i asked him, you know, i know you're a lame duck, i didn't put it that way, but do you think we might get something done? and he said, his response was, around 20%, issue. iranians want to do it something, and the americans and the p5+1 want something but i'm afraid there are so narrowly focused you'll get caught up in the old mistakes and this will be the sort of thing that overcomes the deep mistrust that both sides have. ..
>> there has to be serious negotiation on a constant basis. content wide both sides have presented proposals where they are asking a lot and offering very little, and i've, you know, i've seen both sides. and this is classic. everyone does this. but in this particular circumstance in which neither side trusts one another, they take that proposal as evidence, aha, the other side isn't serious. for the iranians, they're saying once we get rid of the 20% issue, we're done, and all the sanctions should be gone. well, that's not going to happen, right? because we had sanctions and negotiations starting in 2003 and concerns prior to that that
have nothing to do with 20%. you know, iran has to adopt the additional protocol, it has to follow through on its current safeguards arrangements in a way that's forward-leaning rather than reluctant. so the core issues are not going to go away even if we solve 20%, and the iranians need to recognize that. the p5+1, they have to get in the game too. the things they're offering iran are very limited, very small, and in fact, some of them are outdated. offering spare parts for planes really doesn't cut it anymore. i'll stop there, i can expand later. but the process has to change, we have to get serious and meet constantly, and the content of the proposals, something has to be introduced that can demonstrate to the other side that despite the doubts in their heart, something can get done and progress can be made. >> thank you all for your very rich comments. we're going to drill down with the help of some questions from the audience. you might want to pass your 3x5
cards with your questions off to the side. and just to get going, let me just ask ambassador case a little bit more about your personal experience and what you learned from the iraq experience and what that tells us about what could be done, what should be done and what might not be done in the case of iran. i mean, what could we be doing here to give -- and you talked about this a little bit -- iran a face-saving off ramp and to give, to awe void creating artificial -- avoid creating artificial deadlines that trigger some sort of conflict? >> well, iraq was a special case, of course, but it was not an iaea inspection to start with. it was the security council which established a subsidiary organ, and in addition it was an
iaea-affiliated action team which was tasked to focus especially on the nuclear dimension, especially on declared capabilities of iraq. iraq had been praised by the iaea, of course, as you'll recall as a wonderful contributor to a perfect safeguard and so on. it turned out that today had been cheating, very effectively all the time. so that's why one had to create another arrangement. but it was done in that way that it contained very important element, the u.n. dimension: respect for the territorial integrity and independence of iraq. so that meant that the action team could not go to nondeclared
facilities. only delareed facilities could be -- declared facilities could be inspected. but then the security council formed out that right to, i would say, break the integrity to the -- [inaudible] so they were charged with nondeclared facilities and activities. of course, then it was, obviously, chemical, biological. but the beauty of these wars that it's tough sanctions system was in place. we have to have that also. but immediately when the inspection started, the sanction system was gradually released. so this was a functioning system, good behavior led also to these single sanctions. bad behavior, which happened, of course, quite frequently, some
blockages and refusals, was met by some tough language from the security council. not from the israeli government or anyone, it was security council under the charter of the united nations that put that pressure. so, of course, we know that this system works extremely well. it was 100% performance, as a matter of fact. it's not bad for any u.n. organization to get the task, and then i think it's probably the only one which succeeded to make 100% performance. so the, that means that both destruction or capabilities and the monitoring of capabilities were forcefully placed. so everything looked shiny and fine until the u.s. government, it was in spring '97 through madeleine albright, made a
statement at georgetown university to say, well, it looks like, you know, sanctions are -- that the disarmament going well, and if it goes well, we can still not lift the sanctions, which was a condition on the security council. sanctions, so we can't lift the sanctions until saddam hussein is removed. so that came my on selling with the regime change -- my obsession with the regime change. that, of course, destroyed in a sense the institution and operations. so i think that is experience. george bondi was charged by kofi annan to lead the group to see if someone could establish something similar, and this report has not been very much observed. but i think there we have a deal for iran because that will give
real -- [inaudible] to inspections, it will give the right to the international community to go where there is concern, not where iran is declaring. and, but to pay for that is lift sanctions. and certainly gradually lift. you don't need to do it in -- [inaudible] and then we can have so to say -- [inaudible] let the regime change. let the iranian people to take care of it. it's not for the outside to do the regime change. >> thank you. we'll take a question or two from the reporters in the front row, and then we'll go to questions from the audience. if you could just identify yourself and direct your question to a particular person. >> sure. barbara slaven from the atlantic council. jim, i want to get you to talk a little bit more about what would not be small bore, because the
conventional wisdom has been that if you can resolve the 20 president issue that calms the israelis down, they're most worried about 20%, and they're most worried about fordo. so why is that not a good area to begin in return for some sanctions relief of that the iranians would get, something better than what's been put on the table so far? thanks. >> yeah, it's a great question, and that is where the conventional wisdom is, and i agree. 20% is the most urgent near-term priority from a non-proliferation stand point, no doubt about it. and you're right to say that it's part of the whole red line talk shifting in vague red line talk of the israelis. they're focused on fordo. but since you raise fordo, the u.s. position as i understand it is they want it disabled. not simply freezen or not -- frozen or not operating, but disabled.
i think that's going to be a tough pill for the iranians to accept up front. and if you read the foreign policy statement about this, they say, yeah, we know you want us to close fodo, but we've been building it because your threatening to attack us. and they do have a point there. so can they be persuaded to disable for, rdo, will they feel comfortable doing that? maybe they will, but i i doubt . do you go into negotiation and reed with a poison -- lead with a poison pill that the other side can't accept, and you end up nowhere? so i do think something can be done. i think the iranians are willing to talk about it. they realize it's the thing they're most concerned about, and i think we can do -- let us
remind ourselves that it is under iaea inspection, and the 20% is also under iaea inspection. but i think there's more the iranians can do to assure and israel -- and maybe that's a freeze, not disablement, maybe it's only 3-5%, not 20%. there are ways to massage this. but one of the things that makes it easier to get a deal, i think -- and i defer to the diplomats and the professionals on this -- if we're only talking fordo and not iraq, not afghanistan, not the persian gulf where with there are dangers of inadvertent war, how do you -- when you hit an impasse, what do you trade off on? now, if you hit an impasse you can say, okay, fine, i'll give in on this if you give in on that. or you can begin to put a package together where people can find common ground and where they feel like they're getting something out of it that they can take back and sell to their
own people. some people thinkty moment si is you go in and get everything you want and the other side gets nothing. this is not about iran. this is about achieving our diplomatic objectives and making sure they abide by their obligations. so whether you like iran or not doesn't really matter. the question is, can you find a deal that works in that's why i think there's not going to be any grand bargain here, right? but i don't think we should go for the smallest possible bargain either. there's something in between, and part of that, again, is doing something that demonstrates seriousness. something the other side isn't even expecting as a way to break the psychological impasse as well as the diplomatic impasse. >> all right. let's switch over to a couple of questions that have come in here about the -- >> can i ask a question? >> of course. go ahead. >> how would you go about selling that to the congress?
given the hard position that congress is taking regarding u.s./iran relations, how does the legislative accept such a step and such a proposal? >> dude, you're not supposed to ask questions. [laughter] well, first of all, i think a lot of this falls more within the executive than congress. i really don't know what bill congress could, would be required to pass in order for there to be an agreement on for, do, so, you know, obviously, whoever negotiates with iran is going to take some lumps just leak the iranians -- like the iranians. remember, they have a presidential election coming up, and if there's a deal coming up, and it's associated with someone who might be running for president, you better believe their opponents are going to attack it and undermine. but i think the president has enough discretion, and this is an executive issue. it's also a united nations issue and a p5 +3. so i think if united states
comes and says, look, we have the leaders of france and britain and russia and we're trying to prevent nuclear weapons, you know, you should probably not meddle in this, that that's, that's a winnable argument, i think, particularly for an obama that's coming out of this with, you know, out of a strong election. no one liked gadhafi, no one liked libya, but we got a deal on libya. no one liked the soviets, but we got a deal with the soviets. so i think it's doable. >> and i think to partially answer that same question, one of the issues for many in congress is going to be whether this negotiation quote-unquote allows iran to continue enriching at at at the 3.5% level or not. the historical position of the united states going babb to the early 2000 -- back to the early 2000 is that there could be a suspension of all enrichment.
but iran has a lot of truth on the ground in terms of additional centrifuges, and they want their so-called right under the non-proliferation treaty to be recognized, the question is at what level do they continue? >> i think there's also, i agree with that, and i don't want to go on here. i think there's a debate over whether countries have a right the to enrich. they certainly have a right to peaceful activities, and then there's some ambiguity about that. people disagree. but the iranians have said, offer this as a principle, and i think it's important to have principles that allow the negotiation to proceed. one is iran should enrich as much as they need. what iranian could agree with enriching as much as you need? what that really means is not that much enrichment because they only have one nuclear power plant, the russians are supplying fuel for that. we're willing to supply fuel for the tehran research reactor. so one of the problems here is that i think iran's nuclear program is outsized to its
needs. there's way more centrifuges and capacity than it can actually use on the ground, so i think if we have a principle of an appropriately-sized program, then that helps get us part of the way there. >> okay. we have a couple questions from the audience about the internal iranian politics and the regional politics. so, professor sadri and ambassador ekeus, maybe you guys can handle these. with the elections coming up in june, how is that going to affect iran's strategy in the next several months, who is calling the shots during this period. and related to this, as we all know there's a war, a civil war happening in syria. iran is a close ally of the assad scream. how -- regime. how is that affecting rapp's security calculations? -- iran's
security calculations? are they going to want to insert some of those dialogues into the p5+1? how would you answer those questions? >> well, of course, the middle east has changed, a couple of great flip-flops, arab spring, the syria war, and now this confrontation between israel and hamas that somehow kind of brought us back to the middle east that we used the to know the arabs and israelis going at it and egypt being -- [inaudible] but right before that iran saw its fortunes decline, its popularity in the arab streets declined because of the arab spring, and then the syrian situation introduced a very, very important element, almost sectarian element, that eroded iranian influence in the region and the projection of iranian
power hit a brick wall with that. so all of this, of course, goes into the mix of what iran is thinking. and this is one of the reasons. this is a good time to start negotiating with iran as its reach in the middle east seems to be not what it used to be, it's not as soft power, superpower, nor is it a hard power superpower in the renal payoff the situation -- in the region because of the situation in lebanon and syria. p lebanon is really the coming disaster, and syria is the disaster that we're dealing with right now. so, of course, all of this will go on. and if i were american, i would say this is exactly the right time to go into this. the presidential elections are coming, but still as always it's ayatollah khamenei who is calling the shots. and we have to wait and see whom
he appoints as the point person for the upcoming negotiations. we hope that they're upcoming. if he chooses somebody who is of some stature rather than a regular bureaucrat, obviously, that means that he's more serious. but if he sends back -- [inaudible] probably he would not be serious. so we can read the tea leaves there, and i think that, you know, the presidential election really is not that important. what's very important is iran's place in the middle east equation. >> all right. ambassador ekeus, what are your thoughts ability the situation -- about the situation in syria, how that effects -- >> well, it's clear iran is now as expanded as it was during 5, 600 years ago when the persian
empire was struggling with ottomans. i think we have a little of that now. because iran's influence in syria has grown. it has, of course, the situation in gaza with delivered missiles to hamas, but now egypt is jumping in. maybe israel will shake hezbollah, you know, lebanon is still a very strong iranian presence in the gulf especially. poor bahrain is in the deep, so to say, under tremendous pressure from iran. but, and, of course, afghanistan. that's a big prize coming up where iran can influence, maybe also a constructive role. but then it has to partner with the u.s. so i can say the persian influence is enormous. it hasn't been that big, but every -- it's very touchy everywhere, including in iran
itself. we are not sure, you have to recall that the revolutionary in the islamic rev fusion '79 -- revolution '79, these are -- [inaudible] against mostly men, but they start to run into the pension age, and there's another generation which is not at all of that so to say style and direction. you may correct me, but that's my reading of the tea leaves. so iran is huge you, large but shaky all over. but it has an influence. iraq, of course, i mentioned also. but that's why it's so important to add -- i must congratulate jim for his, for his diplomatic skills. because that's exactly, but he almost drew a conclusion from that also. that's still missing in this
diplomatic -- because he talked about 5 +1. everything should be done in the 5 +1. but the 5 +1 are not the appropriate player if you deal with the security in iraq, if you deal with the situation and reform in afghanistan to save afghanistan into so to say a country of decency and progress. only u.s. must step up, and as i said in my first statement, not hide inside the 5. it is nice to be modest -- [laughter] and polite. but the u.s. has the responsibility which i think it should take on, and, therefore, i feel we have to look very closely to other -- modifying the whole set-up of a dialogue with iran. >> very briefly, super briefly -- >> yeah. >> on syria, what strikes me and is surprising is the iranian
talk that they want to talk to the u.s. about syria. when i've seen iranian officials and iranian pieces of paper where they say the u.s. should be out of the middle east, it should do this, it should do that, oh, and i think we should be talking about syria. >> and about afghanistan. >> and about afghanistan. and i want to agree with both my colleagues, but also point out that there's a continuum here, and it's a delicate walk. you want your, the person you're bargaining with to feel an incentive to bargain, right? be which means they're -- which means they're probably feeling a little pain, or they're worried about their situation, so they want to get a deal to settle something up so they can deal with their other problems. but you don't want them to feel so threatened that they pull back. they say to themselves, we are in too weak a position to negotiate. you know, the world is
surrounding us, and we'll be taken advantage of if we negotiate from weakness. so the problems in syria and elsewhere are real, and i think the arab spring has undercut their ability to be a voice for the arabs. but it's going to require some finesse in how you deal with that so they don't simply pull back and withdraw. >> now, we have one other question from the floor about the role of congress that came up a little bit earlier. um, and the possibility of further sanctions, u.s. sanctions against iran. and across the street on cap until hill there are -- capitol hill there are some members who are suggesting there should be further sanctions against iran including blacklisting the entire energy sector. what, what do each of you think that -- what effect might that have, and if particular how might that effect the international coalition that's negotiating with the iranians
and also participating in the u.n. security council imposed sanctions? some i mean, because part of the success, i think, here over the last couping or three years -- couple or three years is there does appear to be greater unity amongst the p5+1 between the russians and chinese about the approach. so how might that effect the dynamics here if congress or yo- if congress were to go forward or? >> i have the question in europe also, and i hope that is wrong, but that's where they were moving the congress that one should also try to block i would say nongovernmental dialogue, you know? i mean, it is extremely destructive and harmful approach. catastrophe, i would say, if it is implemented. but maybe it's typical.
>> well, i think what you said earlier, rolf, was so important about the iraq experience and madeleine albright. so what's the story you're telling? you're telling the story of we sanction a country, they start to do what we want them to do, and then someone announces, well, it really doesn't matter what you do, because we're going to keep the sanctions, and then it falls apart. that's the scenario i fear with the u.s. we love sanctions. i worked on north korea and iran. sanctions are helpful. but they're not the be all and end all. we're not going to squish iran down until they cry uncle and all our problems are going to go away. sanctions are an instrument that are part of a broader dip romatic and military and other approach that is in support of diplomacy. but if we impose sank as we did in -- sanctions as we did in 2003 and subsequently saying we want you to stop your nuclear program and then they start to take the steps we want them to take on their nuclear program and then we say we're going to
keep sakss, well, you know, that's not going to work. so i understand the politics of sanctions, you know, toughness, toughness, toughness. but as the u.s. government, the executive has correctly, i think, correctly perceived, what iran is looking for is a test of our seriousness as we look for a test of their seriousness. are we going to follow lu on our -- follow through on our promises to lift sanctions? if we don't, i don't think we're going anywhere. >> all right. um, we have a couple questions that go back to this issue of a deal on stopping enrichment of 20%. so one question is from the panel's perspective why would it be necessary to ask the iranians to shut down the fordo facility, that's the second underground enrichment facility, if iran were to agree to stop all 20%
enrichment and to ship out whatever 20% enrichment stockpile it has? and the other, another question is this person says déjà vu all over again. this 20% proposal has come up before. why did it fail before? many three years ago the obama administration -- you mentioned this, jim -- suggested a swap of the trr, the the tehran research reactor fuel, in exchange for stopping enrichment. so why didn't that work? so perspectives from the panelists on is it necessary to shut down fordo, and why didn't the 20% fuel swap deal work before? and, i guess, why -- how do we make it work this time? >> brazil has another proposal which i think was a very constructive proposal. it has only one fault, and we
come back to diplomacy, its timing was disastrous because it came the day or day before when u.s. at last got china and russia to enforce tough sanctions on -- so i think in washington what are these guys doing? they're sabotaging our successful sanctions policy, and this terrible, you know, difficult partners we have, china, russia, are onboard. and then they come up with something which, you know, makes the whole thing to capsize. so, you know, the turks and brazil got, you know, politely to withdraw, politely. >> so the timing wasn't right before. >> oh, i think it was a very interesting proposal. i think it may be modified as it was with the ordinary -- [inaudible] the low enriched uranium.
i will come back to that. >> i think we have to be honest about this. there's no difference between a centrifuge that's running in fordo and natanz. the only difference is it's much harder to bomb. i mean, that's the difference, right? and so it's technically not really different, it's politically different because this has been an issue for israel communicated to the united states, and it would be difficult for israel to take out fordo if it's buried under a couple hundred feet of granite or rock. the u.s. could do it. it would be much more difficult for israel to pull that off. and so they worry that iran's going to kick out the inspectors like north korea kicked out the inspectors and make a dash for the bomb. and that's why they don't want them either enriching at 20%,
nor do they want them stockpiling 20% on the ground. you know, if they ship everything out -- which they said they don't want to do, but i think that's negotiable -- if they ship everything out or they just stop using 20% and all the centrifuges in fordo are producing 3-5, you know, that doesn't really, that's not a deal breaker for me. but it's not where the u.s. government's at, it's not where israel is at. so i think it's -- that's why i think i'm a little worried about the upcoming negotiations unless the iranians are willing to disable it, because we're just going to deal with that and already just on that one issue there seem to be significant disagreements. so that's why i'm a little nervous. >> i would also echo the importance of taking every
opportunity we get to come to a, an agreement. we had the turkey/brazil deal that was broken because of this accident that just it came like a couple of days too late. we had another occasion that jim referred to when there was a proposal on the table and looked like iranians took it, they take it back to tehran, it is scuttled because of the internal politics in iran. it's kind of very childish in a way. many politicians tend to be very childish in these situations where, you know, actually most of the reform is, colleagues of ahmadinejad say how come when we make a deal, you come out and you say you sold out the store, you made a deal, and now we are going to us l your efforts? so, actually, it didn't work out for these kind of childish and silly reasons which doesn't mean we shouldn't try. it means we should try again was we have to -- because we have to
try and see when we can get a deal through that is not scuttled. and i think this is a good time because we have been through a lot. the situation is getting very tough on the iranians. also there are worries of outside forces are heightened. so i think it's really a good time right now to give it another chance with good faith and with confidence building and other confidence-building measure, i think, would be an iran/united states cooperation on the drug trade which is what they have in common is a lot of drugs produced in afghanistan. iran is the first line of defense, and americans can completely forget about all the nuclear issues and say on that issue of fighting drug trade we are going to give you some equipment. i mean, so that, that figures kind of completely outside of this negotiation can work as a confidence-building measure. >> all right. thank you for those answers.
another question we have, um, has to do with the iaea's ongoing investigation on iran which i understand is not technically a part of the p5 p5+1 dialogue with iran, it's an issue between iaea, the director general and the iranians. it is going to be going on for some time. there was news reports just in the last month that the iaea and iran were going to meet again in december, in the mid december -- in mid december to discuss what's referred to as the structured approach for investigating activities. what -- so the question here is, you know, how can iran and the iaea resolve those issues, especially when there are serious concerns about potential military dimensions? how does iran get out of that without further criticism for their sanctions but at the same time clean its file?
your thoughts and, ambassador ekeus, this is an issue that the u.n. has dealt with other countries before. what thoughts do you have about what the agency and iran need to do in the next meeting to start to clear this up? >> well, i mean, there are some -- i have written on this and -- [inaudible] but i also have been responded from iaea aside. it's not public, but they indicate that they have some competence. i have questioned the competence of the military. i go that from, of course, my long experience in iraq. my judgment is that iraq has -- iaea has not the competence to deal with the military -- [inaudible] and that, of course, go back to george bondi's proposal to the secretary. i think one must -- there are
ideas floating around in vienna that one should, so to say, see if i can build with specific competence. this is highly sensitive, because it's a proliferation dimension. how do you deal the weapon. and that is, but i think it's very important that -- [inaudible] that's why i think that the security council should take responsibility, because of the dangers, the threat to international peace and security involved in this. so something more similar to something isn't controlled under the security council to build -- [inaudible] but i'm skeptical. i don't say it's wrong if he has competence. but as i say, i'm on the record of questioning the competence of this group and this initiative. >> okay. >> and let me jump in on it and
come at it from a different angle. in a way that is cynical and blunt, but practical, i hope. you know, i accept the -- although i have no evidentiary basis for this, i'm going to accept the head of u.s. intelligence, the dni's statements that iran had a structured nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, right? so they're not, they're not an angel in this regard. i'm willing to accept that they had a structured nuclear program that was halted in 2003 and thin maybe some -- and then maybe some unstructured activities have continued since then. now, as a guy who spends all his time studying nuclear weapons programs, the keyword in that praise is "structured." if you're serious, you have a structured program. you don't have people going off doing things on their own. so they had a weapons program, they shut it down. i think this gigantic military base that the iaea visited but
because it's so large, they went to this building, not that building. then they get some intel that says, well, we think the explosives work was being done in this building, and all this time iran's being watched by satellite continuously, and there's no activity there, nothing, for five years, right? not five years, but some period of time. years. so then the iaea says we want to go to that guilding, and then -- building, and then suddenly there's a whole lot of activity. you know, there's curtains put up and shoveling and scalping of soil and all that sort of thing. so i read this as that was the facility involved in the bomb program. and they're cleaning it up. and iaea is not going to get on the ground until it's cleaned up. now, here's the part where i'm practical and blunt. i don't care, right? this is part of a program from the past, and i wish they didn't have the program from the past, but i'm more worried about iran's nuclear status in the future than the past. and so, you know, if it's dead and all they're doing is
cleaning it up so there's no evidence of what they did before, you know, it's regretful, but i don't care. i would rather get a deal that prevents iran from moving forward towards a nuclear weapon. or moving forward so that we don't have an engagement that leads to audiocassette noor -- to a nuclear weapons program by iran. i think it's probably dirty, and the iaea's not going to get in until it's cleaned up. i will say, though, that i'm troubled by -- you know, this is not your father's iaea. el baradei, like him or don't like him, i'm troubled by the nature of the relationship the agency seems to have with rapp. every time you try to negotiate with iran, you walk away angry and distrustful. i mean, the europeans did it in 2003, the agency's going through it now. but that's a relationship where there will also have to be a
refurbishing of trust, or it's going to be difficult down the line. at the end of the day, it's the big powers at the u.s., russia and france, whatever, if they decide to get a deal, they'll get a deal. but iaea is an independent agency, and that relationship has to be addressed as well. >> and just very quickly, jim, is -- do you think the iaea and iran are going to resolve these issues before the p5+1 and iran work out a broader framework for resolving this, or is it dependent on that? are the iranians going to stonewall the agency until they see -- >> yeah. my, my true answer is i have no idea, and then my guess is the iaea's going to come at the end of the line rather than the beginning. i think we're going to see negotiations with the p5+1 before we see a resolution of military check ins. >> okay. all right. well, we have a couple more or, i think, concluding questions here i'm going to ask the panelists before we shift over to the second part of our program.
and the questions have to do with kind of the longer-range scenarios here. and one question is what happens if these p5+1 negotiations with iran fail to produce either a confidence-building measure or some broader framework in the next few months, and on the flip side, where would we like to be five years from today? if we were to gather once again on a lovely morning in washington, d.c., what would we like to have seen happen before? how do we -- what do we, what needs to be done to reach a sustainable deal on iran's nuclear program? each of you. please, take one of those two big questions. >> no, on the first question i think it's quite simple. there will be an israeli attack
on a couple. not on everything, certainly not, but it will be an action which the israelis will say, look, it worked so well in syria, we attack this facility, blow it up. what happened? it was without any united nations or u.n. charter. it was an attack, but the security council didn't meet, syria didn't complain because it didn't want inspectors to say that -- [inaudible] and nobody complained. i mean, this is a really shocking reaction by the -- that was in violation of the fundamental international law. so i think it is quite clear to me if that scenario comes, that the breakdown of the talks that israel will take a step maybe supported by president obama who's no good on drones and so on. so i'm very pessimistic about
that. >> and what's the result of that strike? what does that lead to from there? briefly. >> well, we had -- some of us are old enough to remember the complaints, big problems in the review conference, talks of delays and blockages and no agreements, and, of course, the general assembly of the u.n. reacted very heavily at that time. but problem is that the lack of leadership will tolerate this. and i'm concerned. i mean, i hope it won't have to, i hope there is a leadership dialogue including this also. on the future there i see something much more optimistic. i see a u.s./iranian cooperation in the regions i mentioned; on
iraq, on afghanistan. they have common interests that may be helpful for the people, and it will be a peaceful, stable afghanistan including taking, struggling with the drug trafficking which, of course, is very important, key component in the afghanistan scenario for iran but also for the or whole europe. i want to see and hope five years that israel and iran will detect that they are de facto strategic partners in that region. they were once, and there were smart people on both sides which understood. i can't see how stupid these two are now when -- [inaudible] very common interests and the complex arabic world. and as i said, these two are natural partners, and they they shouldn't fall down to tactical games and gain point by tactical
steps. and on iran's nuclear, i hope that one take the enrich -- the reason the full initiative by nti here in this town about a nuclear fuel bank, and nti raised $50 million, the u.s. congress raised $50 million, the europeans, e.u. now finally have coughed up something 20 million and then some others. and i think it's a good place for the iranian reactor fuel if they don't need it for the pew star that should be based for the international fuel bank under international control and in the context of iaea. >> professor sadri, your thoughts on what happens on if these talks fail on where we ought to be, where we want to be five years from now. >> well, five years from now i
would like to see a non-nuclear iran, but also i would like to see a less nuclear middle east and a less nuclear world. disarmament, obviously, i'm not optimistic enough to think that it's going to succeed to 100%, but mostly if nuclear countries start taking steps in reducing their stockpiles, that will create the environment for the negotiations that is necessary in iraq. the eventuality of an attack on iran, i think it is not likely because these powers, israel and the united states, know iran is not iraq, iran is not afghanistan, iran not a tribal country. most diplomats who have been to iran -- i don't know whether jim will share this view -- talk about iranians have a very strong sense of national identity. this is a country that has the
oldest national flag in the world. the iranian -- [inaudible] that is mentioned, was not a mythological thing, it was a real artifact captured by the arabs and sold for 300,000 -- [inaudible] and this flag represented not, it was not the coat of arms of some king. it represented the iranian nation. the king had their own coat of arm, but the -- [inaudible] was in front of the troops. so iranians have a very old sense of national identity that transcends various linguistic and ethnic groups. and we saw that in action, that sprint to action in the invasion by europe. so iran is not only bigger and better armed probably and more populace than these other countries, it has a very strong sense of national identity that one cannot find in any of those other cases. and the people who are talking about bombing or invading iran,
there are, you know, they are aware of this. so i hope that there is no steps taken toward invasion, but i would not want to risk it. and i would like to see these negotiations succeed, because if they don't succeed, we are basically playing russian roulette with the national, with the regional security and word security. >> all right. jim? >> before i answer that, i want to say that yesterday was my birthday, and my brother patrick gave me this tie to wear today. >> that's very nice. >> so thank thank you, patrick. i consider this a tv tie. [laughter] all right. good future/bad future. let's start with the good future. the good future is better, but it's not perfect. we're still going to have five years out regionally the arab spring is still going to be working itself out, there'll probably still be animosity between the palestinians and the israelis, there'll be competition between iran and the
gulf states, most notably saudi arabia, but i can imagine a positive future in which iran is a member of the additional protocol and is fully adhering to its safeguards agreements in a way that is affirmative, not defensive. i can imagine, as rolf suggested and i'm an advocate of this, multilaterallization of some piece or pieces of the iranian program where iran is an own or, but others are owners and managers as well on the ground in iran. i see the u.n. security council sanctions going away, a lot of the unilateral sanctions but probably not all the unilateral sanctions. my guess with, being realistic or trying to be, is some sanctions will perfect cyst, but enough -- persist, but enough will come down, and presumably the ones from the u.n. that they'll be able to move forward. maybe a little better crisis communication set up between the u.s. and iran. i'd like to see maybe an adult
relationship where, you know, like the u.s. has with russia or with china, with their frenemies, you know? this where they're not necessarily buddies, but there's diplomatic relations, and you don't like each other, but you talk to each other. i think if we could get all of that, i'd be a happy camper. the downside, if it doesn't go well, well, i think, you know, these things are probablistic. i think on average, you know, we'll probably just get more of the same. there'll be more ken try refuges -- centrifuge, more reactors built, more threats of military strike but not quite there. that's the average. the way you get an average, if you put your foot on a block of ice and your foot on a fire, the average is comfortable. so averages aren't necessarily a good predicter here. i'm thinking that it's less likely than more likely there'll be conflict, but trillion dollar be a -- but there would be a nontrivial possibility of
conflict. i am disheartened and sobered by this report that in 2010 netanyahu went to his cabinet and tried to persuade them to put israel on high alert as a way to get iran to respond that would drag the u.s. into a conflict. now, i don't know whether that's true or not, but it has the look and feel of something that could be true. that's very risk-accepting behavior by a state leader. so it just takes one of those mistakes, or a mistake between two naval ships in the gulf where we get a war. i'm not predicting war, but if it's a 10% or 15% chance, that's given the consequences, that's huge. that's huge. so i would worry about that going forward over time. and you asked the question what do we get if we get a war? we get an iran with nuclear we haves. because they stopped the program in 2003. if they're attacked, i would bet a sizable amount of money that the first consequence is a meeting the next day where they say, oh, yeah?
fine. we're going to build a nuclear weapon. and i think oaz rack, there's strong, scholarly evidence that that was the response of saddam can. prior to the bombing, saddam's nuclear programming was one of several exotic nuke weapons programs. they got bombed, he made it job one. so i'm afraid a war, whatever its implications for the region, as a non-proliferation guy, the most important consequence is a decision for iran to pursue nuclear weapons. >> i'm going to take one more question from the audience. we can't deny the voice of america a question for our panelists here. so if you could just bring the microphone over, please, so that we can hear it all. >> the talks so far for the ten years and last ten years has been negotiation with no fruitful results. but all these years and the actors in the region have been the same. recently, there have been some
changes which might be a new solution, and that is muhammad morsi, the egyptian president, why he took unexpected action yesterday and last week. but yesterday senator, democrat senator carl levin suggested that the biggest challenge is bringing muhammad morsi to the west's side. and perhaps that is something that has to to be looked into. what do you see, how do you see this might work and what the west can do with regards to egypt? >> well, that's a big question. i have actually written about egypt's nuclear weapons program, they had a weapons program under nasser, so it's a question i spent time in, not in a while. you know, i hope that -- this is a question that comes at a point of great confusion and no clarity about the future of egypt, is are morsi's decrees a
power grab or a temporary set of arrangements to help a husband or nurture an egypt pollty that becomes democratic and strong and more legitimate? because mubarak was not he psychiatry mate at the end. i hope that it is a strong democrat, that egypt returns to it rightful place as the leader of the arab world, as the most popular country, that it goes down that path towards democracy, that it's seen as legitimate which means it's going to have different policies, and it's going to, you know, disagree with the u.s. on some things and agree with others. but if it goes down that path, then i think it will be very important for the u.s. and for israel and for others to embrace that egypt in a way that they're able to be a working partner. i don't know how much impact they're going to have on the iranian issue, but insofar as iran is part of southwest asia and the middle east region, a strong and useful and wise egypt
would be helpful overall, you know, whether -- regardless. i think the jury is still out on one with. >> professor sadri, do you have any thoughts about the question? >> i think, i think iran is happier we egypt at the helm of the arab world than the alternative which would be an augmented saudi arabia, the salafist movement that is very anti-shiite, the muslim brotherhood is basically, is not hostile to the idea of an islamic republic. there are very deep ideological connections within the iranian revolution and the writings of the leaders of the muslim brotherhood, and it is also my hope that this move by muhammad morsi just a tactical move to get over certain problems, and i doubt that this would be a power grab, because the muslim brotherhood of today is not the
muslim brotherhood of 30 years ago. >> uh-huh. >> so there has been a -- [inaudible] we have to note that and, of course, i don't know for sure, but i think egypt is on it way back, and there is a possibility that egypt and iran might renew their relationships. it's very turbulent right now, especially with the ahmadinejad government, but the aligning of the basic interests, national interests suggests that there is a possibility that one day somebody in iran would give a new name. [laughter] >> if you wish, quickly. >> well, i had very authoritative friend, and he, his assessment of the egyptian muslim brotherhood was that they were a rather moderate type. he said mubarak made a big strategic mistake by oppressing them and don't give them a play into the egyptian society. so, of course; i was reflecting
poor man is sentenced to death, but he's still not executed. but he has deep and very wise understanding on egypt and the situation in the arabic world in general. but, of course, the -- i -- saudi arabia is there, and i have great difficulties to be, to imagine that morsi will divide himself, good impressions from those two optimists, saudi arabians to say -- [inaudible] they are important elements of the custodians of the holy sites. and iran is challenging that as we all know, and i think this is a sectarian problem, more a strategic problem, religious connotations which i think should be not running too much
optimistic. i think we should be very, very careful this our judgments and watch closely the hamas, the initiative, you know? morsi acted in the gaza operation, rightly so. egypt is there. but without in any way dealing with the palestinian authority, keep them out. i don't know what that indicates. it's a renewed type of strategy egypt has toward the palestinian issue. well, i'm a little more concerned than my friends. >> well, we're, we've run out of time for this segment of our program. i want to just very quickly sum up some of the key points that i heard our three great panelists make during the course of the discussion about iran's nuclear program and about avoiding a war over iran's nuclear program, and that is that we're moving into a very important period with respect to the p5+1 and iran
talks. there's a very important opportunity coming up in the next few weeks that's going to require strong u.s. and iranian leadership, a broader deal that ties iran's enrichment activities to its actual nuclear power needs which are minimal, as jim walsh said, combined with much more extensive iaea safeguards can help guard against a nuclear-armed iran. and we need to look at sanctions as a tool, not necessarily the end goal, a tool in those negotiations in that we need to avoid making regime change appear to be the goal of the u.s. policy, to make it clear that the iranians have an exit ramp from this very difficult situation they've gotten themselves into with the nuclear program. and that, the two sides are going to have to be much more creative, um, in the next round of talks and not simply put forward is same proposals that
have met, been met with resistance in previous rounds. it's going to be tough, but it sounds like diplomacy is the best option on the table. so with that, let -- please join me in thanking rolf ekeus, ahmad sad drink and james walsh for their -- sadri and james walsh for their comments. [applause] we're going to be taking a one-minute -- a two-minute break as we awe just the backdrop here and hear from national security adviser brzezinski, thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> on 16 or 17 bases in the united states, we have military-run schools. the average cost to educate a child in that school per year is
$50,000. almost four times what the rest of public education costs. and many -- and the vast majority of our bases we use public schools. we could take the money we're spending today, pay every public school system 14,000 per child and save billions of dollars per year. just on -- and with the same or better outcomes. >> this weekend you can talk with oklahoma senator tom coburn about the fiscal cliff, affordable care act and the future of the republican party on booktv's "in depth." the senator has written several books and reports including his latest, "the debt bomb." join our three-hour conversation with your calls, e-mails, tweets and facebook comments for medical doctor, author, and senator tom coburn. live sunday at noon eastern on booktv's "in depth" on c-span2. >> more now on drone warfare.
from the ideas forum hosted by the atlantic, the aspen institute and the newseum, this is 15 minutes. we'll show you as much of this as we can until our live event at 8:45 a.m. eastern. >> henry crumpton, depending on how you feel about drones, um, i can refer to him as the inventor of drones or the creator of drone or the grandfather of drones, um, and other things. he wrote a great book, "wired by war," "war by wire" -- >> the art of intelligence. >> oh, the art of intelligence. and shelby coffey who is the creator of the newseum. >> a spoke in a giant wheel, but thank you all so much for coming. we're always enormously honored to have the washington ideas festival here. in the world of spies, ambassador henry crumpton is a
legend, and after 24 years in the cia clandestine services, he became a little more public by helping then-secretary of state copped condoleezza rice coordinate the counterterrorism efforts around the world. he went even more public this past year with a book, a very well-received and well-reviewed book on "the art of intelligence." and behind those emerging from the world of shadows was a driving desire and ambition to educate american policymakers and especially the american public about the needs and uses of intelligence in our hyperconnected world of asymmetrical threats. but before that he created his signal legend in afghanistan where he took roughly 110cia
officers and 400-plus special operations forces to overthrow the taliban. mission accomplished, really, in a few very long weeks. so we'd like to start there, mr. ambassador, and say how did you get that mission, and how did you come up with that plan? >> shelby, thanks for the opportunity to be here. it was an intelligence mission, first and foremost, if we rook at afghanistan, and -- if we look at afghanistan, and we deployed the first teams into afghanistan in september of 1999. so for two years we had developed networks and built trusted alliances with our afghan allies and prospective allies. and so we had a two-year, two years of hard work building this network and building these alliances. so when 9/11 happened, we knew who we could depend upon, and we knew who we could go to. so it wasn't only collecting
intelligence against al-qaeda and the enemy, but also about erstwhile allies and really mapping the human terrain. >> along that path there had been the hunt for osama bin laden, and the first idea for drones came in. and then on drones. tell us a little about that and why you and your team pushed for that. >> it was really a product of great frustration, because we had these human sources, these networks in afghanistan reporting on bin bin laden, on his where are thes, and we in turn were passing this on to the policymakers in the white house and the department of defense, but we could not get the authorities or the resources to go and engage with lethal force against bin laden. this was pre-9/11. they said we needed greater verification. so we looked at balloons, long-range optics and finally decided on the drone, the predator drone. and then we, sure enough, driven
by our human sources on the ground, we found bin laden, a very clear video. we knew exactly where he was, tarnac farms near kandahar, and then we reported the intelligence. and the response was, well, the cruise missiles will take several hours, where is he going to be several hours from now? and at that point we said, okay, we'll have to do it ourselves. so can we attach hellfire missiles to a drone, and that's what compelled the cia to put this program together. and when 9/11 transpired, that's why the cia had armed drones in the theater. >> as you look back on it now, the drone warfare has increased probably well beyond what you foresaw at that time. on balance, the right thing? on balance, a questionable thing? how do you weigh that? >> as any tool, any weapon, it depends on how you employ it. it's exceedingly precise. very small warhead, it can go
through a window. it's a lot better than dropping a 500-pound bomb. it's a lot safer than putting troops on the ground. what concerns me is the potential overreliance on this technology particularly in the absence of human sources. in september of 2001, we had more than a hundred sources in every province of afghanistan scatter ored throughout the country. we only had two drones, one armed, one unarmed. the balance today, i'm sure the it's a lot different. you cannot allow technology to undermine those human relationships, those human networks. >> when, when you look now at the afghanistan war, what echoes from especially those early days as the after a gans spoke to you -- afghans spoke to you, and what given that a lot of the american public just wants to head for the exits soon, what should we be weighing as we think about it? >> the question that resonated
most deeply with me in the fall of '01 when i was in afghanistan talking to our of afghan allies, they asked me this with a great deal of passion, concern, a very simple question: are you going to stay this time? remembering what we had told them during the soviet occupation, that we would help them rebuild their country after the soviets left. of course, that was not the case. we lied to them. they remember that. and so today they're still asking that same question. >> when you decided to come out from behind the shadows and help secretary rice, wrote the book, you helped jennifer simms write a book on transforming u.s. intelligence, one of the things that struck me was you had thought the american public really needs to know more. on the one hand, we love our james bond movies, we like to see you as figures of mystery and romance, and on the other hand if anything goes wrong, why didn't you know that?
what is it that we should know and, first, if you would tell people how president bush reacted when he saw you coming in with condoleezza rice and saw that you were coming out. what would that statement? >> yes. i met president bush, of course, right after 9/11 and briefed him and his team throughout that year from 01 to '02. and he treated me with great respect during that year, but later on when i was at state, he walked in, and he saw me there. he turned to secretary rice, and he said the throat slitter as a diplomat? how is that working? [laughter] >> an interesting question from the top. [laughter] >> and secretary rice is a terrific boss, she said it's working out fine, mr. president. [laughter] the earlier question of why is intelligence important, why do i -- >> what do we need to know? >> -- think the american public and our allies need to
understand what intelligence is, and it's simple, because it's going to be more important. if you look at the growing complexity of the world, these microactors with macroimpact, many nonstate, you look at the chaos and the uncertainty, what that means is that to make informed decisions, we have to have better intelligence. whether it's in government or even in the private sector. so what is intelligence? what's the value? and jennifer simms, professor simms and i talked at length about this, that there needs to be a better understanding. and intelligence is a discipline in its own right. and so what does it mean, and how can we embrace intelligence not just in the secret culture of the clan clandestine servicet how can we inform the customers? and not just the president, but increasingly many of you who may be at risk, and that's why i wrote the book. >> terrific. now, it's been said that history is a set of collisions with the future. what are the three big collisions with the future that are being faced by the american
intelligence world, let's say divided domestically and overseas? >> domestically, there are three. and it's bigger than intelligence. it really involves all of us, it involves american society and our leaders, and i think the three domestically are, one, our economy -- for obvious reasons -- education, our education system is in a poor state, and that really is our most important resource, is our people, an educated work force and the civic responsibility that comes along with that. and third i would say would be health. a third of americans are obese, and you can sum that up by how can we be a strong nation if we're broke and ignorant and fat? [laughter] and so i would start with that. [laughter] >> great. >> in terms of overseas, i believe that the changing nature of warfare, the changing nature
of risk even, we haven't caught up to that reality. >> uh-huh. >> you've got this growing asymmetry of power, and not just al-qaeda, hezbollah or the hacker in cyberspace, but it can it can be very positive too. the next speaker is bill gates, a nonstate actor, an individual. look what he has done, how he has contributed. zuckerberg with facebook, and he developed a society of a billion people networked. there are many positive examples if you look at the asymmetry of power. thats -- that aspect of it and increasing this complex global, integrated marketplace. so just the may nature of war ad risk, that's number one. we've got to understand that better, informed by intelligence. secondly, cyberspace. by good friend, general mike hayden, has talked about the coming pearl harbor in cyberspace. i agree with him. it's going to happen, and we are woefully unprepared. and the third area i would
stress is the growing demographic shift worldwide. for the first time as of last year, more people live in cities. and that trend is accelerating. and if you look at great societies in places like africa, what does that mean for us in terms of demographics, in terms of resources? i think these changes are going to accelerate, and we need to be better prepared for that across the board. so those are sort of three large, general chunks that i think we should focus on. >> focus a little tighter for a minute. >> uh-huh. >> you have been quoted as saying that there are very likely as many or more spies working against u.s. interests inside the u.s. as there were during the cold war. >> yeah. >> which was a head-snapping quote when i read it. who are these people? and what are they after? >> well, i don't know that. that's my best guess. >> yeah, a guess. >> i've been out of government
for six years, but if you look at the value of intelligence, the importance of intelligence, and then you look at the expenditures and the resources by china, by russia, by others -- >> uh-huh. >> -- and what for them is one of their biggest concerns? well, it's the u.s. and not only national security secrets, but increasingly commercial secrets. much of that which can be gleaned or stolen from cyberspace. and it's a dire threat, and i think that in part because we've shifted so much of our attention, so much of our resources in the counterterrorism arena, we've forgotten the necessity of old-fashioned counterintelligence. and that's an important element of this, a big one. >> often i've heard some people who have been involved in counterintelligence say it tends to be seen as a little bit of the red-headed stepchild in the intelligence world. >> yeah. uh-huh. >> why is that when we need it, and what's the cure for it?
>> i think in part because it's something we don't want to think about it. it's very unpleasant to think tk that our agencies or our businesses have been penetrated by a foreign power, by a criminal organization, and is we'd rather think about, well, how do we achieve that goal, a foreign policy goal or a profit objective? that's more fun. that's more positive, and we are a very positive nation. ..
>> the perpetrators were seen. how do you go off the grid now, as a spy? how can you go through -- spend as this event comes to a close we will go live now to an event with florida, former florida governor jeb bush. he's delivering opening remarks at an education summit in washington. the two-day summit is hosted by the foundation for excellence in education. >> i was in tallahassee and ahead to recruit to tallahassee in 1986. i don't think he's ever forgiven me for that. but he was the secretary of commerce as you may remember for a couple years. and after i negotiate his salary, the day governor elect renegotiate his salary, not upward but downward it turns out. that's what he is never an
forgiven me. we became friends as he served in that administration. in 1993, 20 years ago, after coming off a statewide campaign, jeb and i were playing golf in miami and we went back to his house. i said she, jeb, i think have you ever considered running for governor? he said, what? the running for governor? i wouldn't do that if i were you. i'm going to run for governor. we don't think long and hard about these things, but i'm just going to do it. that was in february of 93, and at that time i've had the honor and privilege to be his partner. i was chairman of these three gubernatorial campaigns, and we have become great friends and i have been honored to serve under his leadership. he was the principal governor, politician and he used every bit
of his political power to work for kids who had no other advocates, and for parents, most of them didn't vote for him. he was all in on education, and used every bit of this office and power to achieve what seemed so simple then, but is obviously much more complex. the numbers speak for themselves in terms of what we've been able to achieve. persistence, courage, principle, strategic thinking. as jeb likes to say, the job is never done. and there's a room full people today who can attest to the fact that the job isn't done yet. it is with great honor and pride that i introduce governor jeb bush. [applause]
>> thank you guys. thanks. thank you. thank you, phil, for the overly generous introduction. thank you all for coming. patricia and i and a couple of the people five years ago, about two months prior to this, five years ago, were fretting that we were worried that in orlando in the first summit that anybody would show up. and quite a few people left, showed up five years ago than today, and we are so delighted you're here. more importantly, we are delighted you were involved in something that i think is a cause bigger than ourselves, which is the restoration of american greatness by assuring that the next generation as the power of knowledge. we all come in a different kind of way, are involved in this but i know it gets frustrating because the big fight. this is not a happy place if you
want to be advocating big things. and i know it gets frustrating, and hopefully the summit provides a place where you can feel comforted that you're not alone, that our whole lot of other people who share this belief. in fact, 900 people from 45 states are here. i'd like to recognize governor perdue of north carolina and governor lepage of maine. governors are really important. i used to be one. i thought they were important than. so out of all the really important people, i just wanted to pay tribute to the q-card governors. i think governor in color from michigan who is now head of the business roundtable is going to be here, or is here now. michael was the secretary of education in great britain is here, and we're delighted that he last night shared some of his feelings about education reform, and how we have so much in common, the challenges. these are global challenges. every country is facing them.
and he shared a perspective that was really interesting. i want to thank the speaker's that will be speaking to us over the next two days. secretary duncan, who i think has been a spectacular job as secretary of education here in washington. condi rice, and joel klein, a very dynamic duo will be sharing their views about the importance of education reform as it relates to foreign policy. john podesta will be speaking tomorrow, and mitch daniels who i think is probably the greatest sitting governor in the united states. no disrespect to the other governors in the room, in terms of education policy and moving the needle. we are going to award him with the first annual education excellence award, and i think he is well deserving of it as he moves onto purdue university. so we thank you for being here. i don't know about you but i get moved a lot by books.
smart people, i'm not that smart so i try to steal ideas from people. there's no trademark on these things, as best i can do. i've never gotten sued for. i encourage you all to do it, too. this prologue, we're at the national archives building last night, it is etched on the side of the building. history has a way of repeating itself, so learning from history i think is important. i just read a book written by charles murray, a great social scientist, that, i read it about six months ago. it still disturbs me. each time i think about it because it describes in some ways this great challenge we face as a nation. it really describes the change in our society away from an upwardly mobile socially mobile country that has shared purpose and shared identities to a country that is changing not for the better. in fact, what marie does is he
takes, through all sorts of data points, mostly from the senses but all sorts of other data points, he describes belmont, massachusetts, in 1960 and compares it to fishtown, which is a blue-collar community inside urban philadelphia. and he takes out all a minority elements, the data points and these numbers, and basically looks at white america in 1960, an upper-middle-class belmont, massachusetts, and compares it to working class, middle class philadelphia, and then sees what happens over the last 80 years. and what happens is tragic for our country. belmont, 50 years later, has been pretty good. income levels and returns are slightly up. outcomes as relates to high school graduation and college graduations are extraordinarily good. crime rates were low, and they actually got lower. families are intact.
church participation, civic participation, all of the indicators that one would suggest traditionally at least in our country are the indicators of a healthy kind of community. belmont is doing quite well. fishtown, on the other hand, which was the gaps between fishtown in 1960 and belmont were narrow. incomes work that difference, but fishtown have seen incomes drop dramatically in real terms. college participation rate for the first time, and this is a train in our own country across the country, college graduation rates are actually lower 50 years later than the war in 1960. high school graduation rates are lower. crime rates have gone. family life has been decimated. either people are not getting married and having children, or they're being divorced. church participation is down. education outcomes are down, and now have these big, huge gaps
between what was a middle-class community where people could wake up each day and say, if i work really hard, and i dream the biggest possible dream, i could be the next successful person. in the pursuit of the success that create more opportunities for more people, that is by definition, this notion of who we are as a notion. it's going away. it's leading us. so the first thing i would say is i think it's important for us to realize, and the arguments, marie's point is this is a cultural phenomenon. others could make the case this is an economic phenomenon. i don't think it's as important what the cause is. the first step is to recognize that we had huge problem problem in our country. these gaps on income and the fact is more and more people that are born into poverty will stay into poverty and the middle-class is being disrupted in ways that are dramatic. still a huge problem. we will let others have the debate about why this. it may be a combination of many
things, i think we can all share the belief that there is one path that we know for certain that could change this course. and that is to assure the we move to a child centered education system where we have no excuses for the type that we have these big education gap that will yield income gaps and lives that are constrained, because people don't have the power of knowledge. in fact, in america today, one of the most mobile countries in the world, a generation ago, 43% of people born into poverty will stay into poverty. 4% of people born into poverty will make it through the top quintile of income in our country. where is the outrage? where is the shame of this? this is not the american that we love. this is a dramatically changed america. so my first point would be that way to shake the complacency off
of us. all of us have a role to play i think to shake the complacency that exists, to challenge the orthodoxy so of the time, to assure that we reverse this before it's too late. in america today, a third of our kids, i know this will sound strange to many people that don't follow this as carefully, but you all, particularly those in the legislature know this, we spend more per student than any country in the world. a third of our kids graduate from high school, prepared to be their career ready or college ready. a third get a piece of paper that says i've graduated from high school, and that may give them some sort of pride but if you try to get a job bill have to take remedial work, to be able to be qualified for an entry-level job if they want to go to higher education bill have to take remedial math and english. we have great community colleges that deal with this. we are a majority of students are taking high school were over again because we didn't get it right at all. and a third drop out.
in the world where moving toward, those numbers are unacceptable. so what's the solution? what do we do and how do we do it? the good news is that in the states that are represented here today, a lot of great work is being done. it's being done in a comprehensive way. i would suggest to you that high standards, i'm not kidding standards, the same for everybody is the first step. secondly, that we need robust accountability where there's a different consequence when you have success and improvement or excellence compared to mediocrity and failure. third, that we need to have a teacher evaluation system that is based on teachers being professionals, not part of some collective trade union bargaining process. third, that we need robust school choice because at least my anecdotal evidence is that 13,000 monopolies don't change unless there are options. unless we put pressure on these systems, it will always be
insular and focus on the adults. and then we need to embrace technology. the most important thing we do for our society and the most technological age that has ever existed, there's huge opposition to embracing technology in a way that could transform how our education system works. all of you know how hard it is to implement an agenda that is based on these five points. because all of you in some form or another are trying to do this at the state level. it's three steps forward, two steps back. i was just told of a federal judge that decided that in one of the parishes in louisiana, after the most historic legislation that he sponsored, that was signed into law by governor general, that it's been ruled unconstitutional. we have a similar kind of challenge in the state of florida. these are setbacks that require constant vigilance and continued work. they will be pus